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Federal debt management policy has been a 
topic  of  interest  among  economists  for  many 
years.  Among  issues currently  unresolved  are 
those  concerned  with  the  relative  desirability 
and economic  effects  of  alternative  debt 
management  policies.  Do  changes in  the 
maturity composition of the Federal debt affect 
financial  markets  and  the  economy?  If  so, 
should  policymakers  administer  the  Federal 
debt  with  economic  stabilization  purposes  in 
mind?  Or should  the  main  concern  be  with 
other  objectives  such  as  minimizing  interest 
costs or lengthening the average maturity of  the 
Federal  debt?  This  article  examines  these 
issues.  The  first  section  defines  debt 
management  and  discusses  the  size  and 
composition of the Federal debt in recent years. 
The  second  and  third  sections  examine  the 
possible objectives of Federal debt management 
policy  with  respect  to two  broad  categories- 
economic  stabilization  and  interest  cost 
minimization.  Federal  debt  management 
policies  are  examined  in  terms  of  their 
economic  implications  on  the  financial  and 
nonfinancial sectors of the economy. 
THE STRUCTURE OF THE 
FEDERAL DEBT 
Federal  debt  management  policy  may  be 
defined  as  the  policy  that  establishes  the 
Federal debt's  maturity composition-the 
relative  supplies  of  securities  with  different 
maturities.  In this article, the Federal debt is 
defined  to  consist  of  the  outstanding 
interest-bearing marketable Treasury securities 
held  by  private  investors.  Several  features  of 
this definition should be noted.  First, the total 
size of  the Federal debt  is -defined to exclude 
the noninterest-bearing  money liabilities of the 
Federal  Government.  Policy  concerning  the 
substitution of  money for interest-bearing 
Federal debt, or vice versa,  is  usually assumed 
to be in the province of  monetary policy. 
Second, the portion of the total  outstanding 
Federal  debt  relevant  to  debt  management 
policy is  the amount held by  private  investors. 
Thus,  the  holdings  of  Treasury  securities  by 
U.S.  Government  agencies,  U.  S.  Government 
trusts,  and  the  Federal  Reserve  System  are 
excluded  since  .they  primarily  involve 
intergovernmental transfers. 
Finally,  debt  management  policy  is  jointly 
determined by  the actions of  the Treasury and 
the Federal Reserve System. The Treasury may 
conduct debt management  policy  through 
ordinary  refunding  of  maturing  Federal  debt 
and ' by  exercising  call  options  on  some 
outstanding issues. The Federal Reserve System 
may  change  the  composition  of'  the  Federal 
debt through open marketoperations designed 
to substitute Treasury securities in its portfolio 
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THE SIZE OF THE FEDERAL DEBT 
1956  1966  - -  1976  -  1956-66  1966-76 
(Bill~ons  of  Dollars)  (Average Annual 
Percentage Change) 
Total  interest-bearing  Federal  debt  274.2  325.0  652.5  1.9  10.1 
Nonrnarketable  issues  1 13.8  107.0  231.2  -0.6  11.6 
Marketable  issues  160.4  218.0  421.3  3.6  9.3 
Held  by  private  investors  130.5  159.1  307.8  2.2  9.3 
Interest  outlays  in  U.S.  budget*  6.3  11.3  34.6  7.9  20.6 
(Per  Cent) 
Ratio  of the  total  interest-bearing 
Federal  debt  to GNP  65.2  43.2  38.2  -3.4  -1.2 
Ratio  of  marketable  issues  held  by 
private  investors  to GNP  31 .O  21.1  18.0  -3.2  -1.5 
Ratio  of  interest  outlays  to total 
U.S.  budget  outlays*  8.9  8.4  9.4  -0.6  1.2 
*Fiscal  years. 
SOURCE:  Treasury Bulletin. 
with  Treasury  securities  held  by  private 
investors with different maturities. Conse- 
quently, when the Federal Reserve System has 
sufficiently large and 'diverse. holdings  of 
Treasury securities, its potential for  producing 
changes in the composition of  the Federal debt 
equals the wide  range of  possibilities available 
to the Treasury. 
Marketable  interest-bearing  Federal  debt 
held by  private investors increased from $130.5 
billion in  1956 to $307.8 billion in  1976. (See 
Table 1.) During the decade beginning in 1956, 
the average annual rate of  growth was only 2.2 
per cent.  In contrast, during the more  recent 
1966-76  period,  the  rate  of  growth  increased 
substantially to average 9.3 per cent annually. 
However, the relative size of  the Federal debt 
has  generally  decreased  during  the  last  two 
decades. The ratio of  the marketable  interest- 
bearing Federal debt held  by  private investors 
to gross national product (GNP) declined from 
31.0 per cent in  1956 to 18.0 per cent in  1976. 
Despite  the  slight  average  annual  rate  of 
decline of  1.5 per cent during the last decade, 
the value of  this ratio increased from 16.7 per 
cent in 1975 to 18.0 per cent in 1976. 
Interest  costs  on  the  Federal  debt  have 
increased substantially during the last decade. 
As  indicated in Table 1, interest outlays by  the 
Federal  Government  increased  from  $1 1.3 
billion in 1%6 to $34.6 billion in  1976, growing 
at an average annual rate of 20.6 per cent. This 
rise was  due both to the increase in  absolute 
size of the Federal debt and to the higher yields 
on  the  Treasury securities  issued  during  the 
period.  However,  for  the  entire  period Table 2 
THE COMPOSITION OF THE PRIVATELY HELD MARKETABLE 
INTEREST-BEARING FEDERAL DEBT FOR SELECTED YEARS 
(In Per Cent) 
Years to  Matur~ty  1956  1966  - -  1976  1956-66  1966-76  - 
(Changes) 
Within  1  year  34.9  42.1  51.2  7.2  9.1 
1  to  5  years  30.6  30.3  33.7  -0.3  3.4 
5 to  10  years  12.7  15.4  10.1  2.7  -5.3 
10 years  and  over  21.8  12.2  5.1  -9.6  -7.1 
Total  100.0  100.0  100.0  0.0  0.0 
SOURCE: Treasury Bulletin. 
considered,  interest  costs  as  a  ratio  to total 
U.S. budget outlays have stayed in the range of 
8 to 9 per cent. 
The  maturity  composition  of  the  Federal 
debt has exhibited significant changes over the 
past  two  decades.  (See  Table  2.)  The 
percentage  of  securities  held  by  private 
investors maturing within  1 year has increased 
from 34.9 per cent in 1956 to 42.1 per cent in 
1966, and to 51.2 per cent in 1976. In contrast, 
privately held Treasury securities with 10 years 
and  over  to  maturity  have  declined 
proportionately throughout these periods to 5.1 
per cent of  the total in 1976. However, due to 
the recent emphasis by the Treasury in issuing 
long-term  securities,  the  percentage  of 
securities with  10 years  and  over  to maturity 
has increased to 5.8 per cent of the total in the 
third quarter of 1977. 
ECONOMIC STABILIZATION AS AN 
OBJECTIVE OF FEDERAL DEBT 
MANAGEMENT POLICY 
This  section  investigates  the  potential 
effectiveness of  Federal  debt  management  for 
economic  stabilization.  Federal  debt  manage- 
ment is potentially effective for stabilization  if 
changes in the maturity composition of the debt 
do, in  fact,  affect  the economy.  Two types  of 
effects may  be distinguished-the interest 
rate effect and the liquidity effect.'  A change in 
the maturity composition  of  the  Federal  debt 
will  have  an impact  on  the economy  through 
the  interest  rate  effect: if  two  conditions  are 
met. The first condition is that changes in the 
maturity composition of the Federal debt affect 
the  relative  yields  on  different  maturities  of 
Treasury  securities,  implying  that  investors 
view  different maturities of Treasury  securities 
as distinct financial assets.  Second, given  that 
different  maturities  of  Treasury  securities  are 
1 A detailed analysis of the liquidity impact of Federal debt 
management  is  beyond  the  scope  of  this  article. 
Researchen  who  have  investigated  the  liquidity  impact 
usually find that a shift from long-  to short-term Treasury 
se~rities  promotes economic expansion. However, in times 
of full employment and full capacity utilization, a similar 
shift may propagate inflationary excess aggregate demand. 
See, for example, Warren L. Smith, "Debt Management in 
the United States," in Joint Economic Committee, Study of 
Employment,  Growth,  and  Rice  Levels  (Washington: 
Government Printing Office, 1960); and James  Van  Home 
and  David  A.  Bowers,  "The  Liquidity  Impact  of  Debt 
Management," Southern Economic Journal, Vol. 34 (April 
1968), pp. 526-37. 
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composition of  the Federal debt affect private 
security  yields  which  influence  the  level  of 
economic activity.  In  particular,  a  decline  in 
long-term private security yields  may  increase 
the incentive to produce capital' goods, and an 
increase  in  long-term  private  security  yields 
may decrease the incentive to produce capital 
goods. 
Federal Debt Management and 
Treasury Security Yields  . 
There  are  several  competing  theories 
concerning  the  impact  of  changes  in  the 
maturity composition of  the  Federal  debt  on 
relative  yields  of  different  maturities  of 
Treasury securities. Two such theories are the 
"pure  expectations" and  "market  segmenta- 
tion" hypotheses. 
The "pure expectations" hypothesis implies 
that  a  change  in  the  relative  supplies  of 
different maturities of  Treasury securities does 
not affect their relative yields. The rationale of 
this theory is  that,investors are not concerned 
about  the  lengths  to  maturity  of  different 
Treasury securities. Instead, investors are 
concerned  only  with  the  expected  holding- 
period yields2 on securities. For example, if  an 
investor  has  a 3-month  planning  horizon,  he 
may  compare the current .yield  on  a 3-month 
Treasury  bill  with  the  interest  payment  and 
expected capital gain on a long-term Treasury 
security. If the expected holding-period yield on 
the long-term Treasury security is greater, the 
investor  will  purchase  the  long-term  security, 
and  vice  versa. Thus, ,this theory implies that 
investors buy and sell securities until all future 
2 A security's holding-period yield is defined as the.sum of 
interest payments and capital gain that occurs during the 
period of measurement as a  -per cent of  its beginning-of- 
period  price.  The  capital  gain,  in  this  'sense,  may  be 
positive, negative, or zero.  .  ,. 
holding-period yields are expected to be equal,' 
regardless of  the relative amounts supplied in 
the market. 
In  contrast,.  the  "market  segmentation" 
hypothesis asserts that a change in the relative 
supplies  of  different  maturities  of  Treasury 
securities does  affect their relative yields.  The 
rationale of  this  theory  is  that investors  have 
definite  preferences for  specific  maturities  of 
Treasury  securities  which  result  from 
institutional or regulatory factors. For example, 
since the liabilities of insurance companies and 
pension  funds  are  committed  for  long 
durations, these types of investors may prefer to 
invest  in  long-term  financial  assets.  In  this 
case,  a  difference  in  the  expected  3-month 
holding-period  yields  between  3-month  Trea- 
sury bills and long-term Treasury securities will 
not induce these investors to shift out of  their 
preferred  maturity  unless  the  differential .is 
substantial.  Hence,  the market  yields  on 
securities  with  different  maturities  are 
determined by  the approximately independent 
market  demands  and  supplies  for  each 
maturity  class  of  Treasury  securities.  This 
implies that the expected holding-period yields 
for securities with different maturities may not' 
be identical over a given period, and that shifts 
in  relative  supplies  affect  relative  yields  by 
changing  the  individual  supplies  in  the 
segmented markets for Treaiury securities.' 
3 Other  variants  of  this  theory  have  included  risk  o; 
liquidity  premiums  in  the  yields on  long-term  securities. 
This is based on the reasoning that investors may want to 
hold securities for only relatively short time periods. Thus, 
if  a long-term security was purchased, there would be the 
risk  of  having  a  capital  loss.  Therefore,  in  order  to 
persuade  investors to purchase long-term  securities,  they 
must have higher yields as compensation for their greater 
risk. See, for example, John  R. Hicks, Value and Capital 
(London: Oxford University Press, 1939), pp. 141-52. 
4 For  further'  discussion  of  the  market  segmentation 
hypothesis, see J. M. Culbertson, "The Tenn Structure of 
Interest Rates," Quarterly Journal of  Economics. Vol. 71 
(November 1957), pp. 485-517. To summarize,  under the.  pure expectations 
hypothesis, changes in the relative supplies of 
different maturities of  Treasury securities 
would  be  ineffective  in  changing  the  term 
structure  of  Treasury  security-interest  rates, 
and under the market segmentation hypothesis, 
changes in relative supplies would  be effective. 
However, .actual  -market yields are most likely 
determined  by  market  forces  consisting of  a 
combination of  these theories. Thus, the actual 
extent of  the effect on Treasury security yields 
from a change in the maturity composition of 
the Federal debt must be resolved empirically. 
Previous empirical research tends to support 
the pure expectations hypothe~is.~  However, the 
methodolo$es  used  in  previous research  have 
several shortcomings. First, these studies have 
not  investigated  the  demand  for  Treasury 
securities by  separate categories of  investors, 
such as insurance companies,  pension  funds, 
5 A partial list of the empirical research that finds small, if 
any,  effects  on  the  term  structures  of  Treasury  security 
interest rates from a change in the maturity composition of 
the  Federal  debt  includes  Arthur  M.  Okun, "Monetary 
Policy,  Debt  Management,  and  Interest  Rates:  A 
Quantitative  Appraisal," in  Commission  on  Money  and 
Credit, Fiscal and Debt Management  Policies (Englewood 
cliffs:'  Prentice-Hall,  1963),  pp.  331-80;  Robert  Haney 
Scott.  "Liauiditv  and  the  Term  Structure  of  Interest 
and  commercial  banks.  Thus,  any  influences 
from  partly  segmented  markets-because  of 
differing  portfolio  selection  behavior  among 
separate categories of  investors-have not been 
included  in  previous  studies.  Second,  these 
studies have utilized reduced form equations in 
describing  market-determined  Treasury  secu- 
rity yields. That is, instead of using supply and 
demand relationships for various maturities of 
Treasury securities and  finding  those  interest 
rates that equate the individual market supplies 
with the individual market demands, the most 
common  approach  has been  to try  to explain 
interest  rates  by  using  any  of  the  possible 
variables  that  may  influence  investors' 
demands. While the reduced form procedure is 
appropriate  when  it  is  constrained  by  the 
underlying demand relationships, previous 
empirical  research  has  not  imposed  this 
restriction. Finally, many previous studies have 
neglected  the possible implications of  cash  or 
wealth flows on the short-run portfolio selection 
behavior of  investors. 
The  shortcomings  outlined  above  were 
avoided in  recent empirical research where the 
impact on yields from a changebin the relative 
supplies  of  different  maturities  of  Treasury 
securities  is  analyzed  by  constructing  a 
Rates,"  ~u;ner&  ~ournal  of Economics,  Vol. 79 (February  disaggregated structural model.'  The model is 
1965), pp. 135-45; .Franc0 Modigliani and Richard Sutch,  dksigned to explain how yields are determined  "Innovations in Interest Rate Policy," American Economic 
Renew,  vol.  56  (May 1966).  pp.  178-97; Modigliani and  and to identify the factors that affect yields.  In 
Sutch,  "Debt  Management  and  the  Term  Structure  of  the  model,  yields  on  different  maturities  of 
Interest  Rates:  An  Empirical  Analysis  of  Recent  Treasury  securities  are  determined  by 
Experience,"  Journal  of  Political  Economy,  Vol.  75 
 st 1967).  569-89:  Michael  Hamburner  and  considering the market demands and supplies. 
wiliai  L. ~ilber:  "Debt ~analtement  and 1ntere2 Rates:  The  demand  for  Treasum  securities  in  each 
A  Re-examination  of  the  ~vfdence," The  Manchester  miturity  category  by  v,&ious  categories  of 
School of Economic and Social Studies, Vol. 39 (December 
1971).  261-67;  and Richard W.  Lang and ~~b~*  H.  investors is determined separately. In addition, 
~asche;  -"Debt  Management  Policy  and the  Own-Price  special attention is given to short-run portfolio 
Elasticity  of  Demand  for  U.S.  Government  Notes  and  adjustment and to the  impact of  new  cash  or 
Bonds,"  Federal  Reserve  Bank  of  St.  Louis  Renew, 
September  1977,  pp.  8-22.  Somewhat  larger effects than 
those indicated  in these studies have been found  by  Gail 
Pierson. See  Pierson, "Effect of  Economic Policy on  the  6 V.  Vance  Roley,  A  Structural  Model  of  the  U.S. 
Term Structure of  Interest  Rates," Review  of  Economics  Government  Securities  Market,  Ph.D,  dissertation, 
and Statistics, Vol. 52 (February 1970), pp. 1-11.  Haward University, 1977. 
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DYNAMIC SIMULATION RESULTS FOR THE 3- TO 5-YEAR AND 
LONG-TERM YIELDS ON TREASURY SECURITIES FOR 1960:l-1975:lV 
(In Per Cent) 
Experiment 
Actual  Control  Difference  I  Yields  ,  Mean  Mean  RMSE*  Mean  from  Control  - -  - 
3-  to 5-year  5.44  5.43  0.34  5.07  -0.36 
Long-term  5.21  5.1 9  0.20  5.70  a.51 
(  *RMSE is  the root-mean-square error. 
wealth  flows  on  the  short-run  demand  for 
Treasury securities. . 
After determining the Treasury security 
demands  for  each  investor  group,  the 
individual demands are totaled  across investor 
groups to arrive at market demands for each 
maturity  category.  Total  demands  along with 
the  outstanding  supplies  are  then  used  to 
determine the yields on each maturity category. 
The investor categories included in the model 
are  commercial  banks,  households,  life 
insurance  companies,  mutual  savings  banks, 
nonfinancial  corporate  businesses,  other 
insurance  companies,  private  pension  funds, 
savings and loan associations, state and  local 
government general funds, and state and local 
government  retirement  funds.  The  maturity 
categories  are  formed  by  disaggregating 
Treasury securities into four weighted maturity 
classes. Short-intermediate-term and long-term 
Treasury securities, which  roughly  correspond 
to 2 to 5 years and over  loz  years to maturity, 
respectively,  are  currently  included  in  the 
model.  . 
The empirical  results of  the model  indicate 
that  the  disaggregated  structural  model 
performs  well  in  explaining  Treasury  security 
yields with a high degree of accuracy. A control 
simulation  was  used  to determine the model's 
performance during the sample period used for 
estimation  (1960:I-1975:IV).  The control 
simulation  determines  the  Treasury  security 
yields predicted by the model.'  The results for 
the  control  simulation  reported  in  Table  3 
indicate that the model has no significant bias 
in  its  within-sample  predictions-that  is,  the 
actual average yields of 5.44. and ,521  per cent 
are very close to the predicted average yields of 
5.43 and 5.19 per cent for the 3- to 5-year and 
long-term yields, respectively.' In addition, the 
model's. within-sample  predictive  performance 
is  comparable  to  preiious  approches  on  the 
basis  of  the  reported  measure  of  dispersion 
(root-mean-square error) on the predicted 
yields. 
More  importantly,  the empirical  results  of 
the  model  ,indicate  that  the  maturity 
composition  of  the  Federal  debt  does  affect 
Treasury security yields. This  is  shown  by  an 
experiment. In the experiment, the structure of 
7 In addition, the control simulation is fully dynamic in the 
sense that all lagged endogenous variables (i.e.,  Treasury 
security yields and demands) take values solved from the 
model in previous periods. 
8 The fad that there is no significant bias in the results for 
the control simulation  is  not  a  property  that  necessarily 
follows from  the  way  the  model  is  constructed.  Unlike 
single equation  models  that  contain  constant  terms,  the 
mean of the "predicted values does not necessarily equal 
the  mean  of  the  actual  values.  In  addition,  the control 
simulation  uses values solved in  the model for  all  lagged 
endogenous  variables  included  in  the  model  thereby 
canceling the necessity of  the  zero bias  property  even  in 
single equation models. the Federal debt was changed  permanently by 
shifting  $2.5  billion  from  short-intermediate- 
term  securities  to  long-term  securities 
beginning  in  1959:IV.9  That  is,  levels  of 
short-intermediate-term  and  long-term  Trea- 
sury securities  were made different from  their 
historical  values,  in  the  manner  indicated 
above,  by  $2.5  billion  in  each  period.  As 
reported  in  Table  3,  this  shift  resulted  in  a 
decrease of the 3- to 5-year yield by an average 
of  36  basis  points,  and  an  increase  in  the 
long-term yield by an average of 51 basis points 
over the period beginning in 1%0:I and ending 
in 1975:IV. 
The impact of Changes in the Maturity 
Compositlon of  the Federal Debt on 
Private Security Yields 
When  considering  the  effect  of  debt 
management  on  private  security  yields,  it  is 
usually maintained that the impact depends on 
investors'  behavior  in  making  portfolio 
selections  among  Treasury  and  private 
~ecurities.'~  The  analysis  of  the  impact  on 
private security yields, and the role played by 
investor  behavior;  may  be  simplified  by 
assuming that there is only one type of  private 
security-equity.  In the simplified  model 
including equity,  short-term  Treasury  securi- 
ties, and long-term Treasury securities, the link 
between  private  security  yields  and  the 
9 These changes correspond to a 6 per cent average change 
for short-intermediate-term securities,  and  a  14  per  cent 
aver?ge change for long-term securities. 
10 See, for example, Earl  R. Rolph, "Principles of  Debt 
Management," American Economic Review.  Vol. 47 (June 
1957),  pp.  302-20;  James  Tobin,  "An  Essay  on  the 
Principles  of  Debt  ~anagement,"'  in  Commission  on 
Money  and Credit, Fiscal and Debt Management Policies 
(Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1963), pp.  143-218; and 
0:  H.  Brownlee and  I. 0.  Scott, "Utility, Liquidity, and 
Debt  Management," Econometrica,  Vol.  32  (July  1963, 
pp. 349-62. 
nonfinancial economy is described  in terms of 
the yield on equity. If, for example, the yield on 
equity falls (price increases),. then investment in 
capital goods increases. That is, since the price 
of  equity  is  the  price  of  a  unit  of  existing 
physical capital, the higher the price of equity 
compared to the price (reproduction cost) of  a 
unit of new capital, the greater the incentive to 
produce new capital goods. Hence,  an increase 
in  the  price  of  equity  (decrease  in  yield) 
stimulates the economy. 
Three different  types of  investors'  portfolio 
selection behavior have been hypothesized. The 
types differ according to investors'  assessments 
about  the  degree  of  substitutability  among 
equity,  short-term  Treasury  securities,  and 
long-term  Treasury  securities.  One  type  says 
that short-  and  long-term  Treasury  securities 
are regarded  as  perfect  substitutes  since' both 
haye fixed nominal returns and no default risk. 
The empirical results presented earlier make it 
possible to reject this type of  investor portfolio 
selection behavior.  In particular, the ability to 
change  the  spread  between  short-  and 
long-term  Treasury  security  yields  is 
contradictory  to  the  perfect  substitutes 
hypothesis which implies that the yield spread 
would remain constant. 
A second'type of  portfolio selection behavior 
says  that  long-term  Treasury  securities  and 
equity are regarded as perfect substitutes since 
both are long-term financial assets. This second 
type also may be questioned  because it implies 
that investors do not distinguish between other 
characteristics of  long-term Treasury securities 
and equity.  In particular, since the return  on 
equity  depends  on  -the  earnings  of  private 
corporations  and  the  return  on  long-term 
Treasury  securities  includes  a  fixed  nominal 
interest payment, investors probably view  these 
assets as imperfect substitutes. 
'The third type of portfolio selection behavior 
says that equity, short-term Treasury securities, 
20  Federal Reserve Bank of  Kansas City  Economic Review  February 1978 and long-term Treasury securities are imperfect 
substitutes because of either their differing time 
to maturity or risk characteristics. Based on the 
above  criticisms  of  the  other  two  types,  this 
third type appears to provide the most accurate 
description  of  actual  investor  behavior.  In 
addition,  the third  type of  investor  portfolio 
selection behavior implies that changes in  the 
maturity composition of  the Federal debt affect 
private security yields.  For example, a shift in 
Treasury security  supplies  from  long-  to 
short-term  Treasury  securities  would  leave 
investors  wanting  to  purchase  long-term 
Treasury  securities,  and  sell  short-term 
Treasury securities to restore the previous asset 
composition of  their  portfolios.  However, with 
the  change  in  the  supplies  of  short-  and 
long-term Treasury securities, investors on  the 
whole  cannot. restore  the  original  asset 
composition  of  their  portfolios.  Since  total 
investor  demand  for  long-term  Treasury 
securities  is  greater  than  supply,  and  total 
investor  demand  for  short-term  Treasury 
securities  is  less  than  supply,  the  price  of 
long-term  Treasury securities is  bid  up (yield 
falls)  and  the  price  of  short-term  Treasury 
securities  is  bid  down  (yield  rises). 
Furthermore, during this process, investors are 
also  evaluating  the  desirability  of  holding 
equity relative to the separate amounts of short- 
and  long-term Treasury  securities.  Since  the 
yield  on  long-term  Treasury, securities  has 
decreased,  investors  desire to hold  more 
equity;  but  since  the  yield  on  short-term 
Treasury securities has risen, investors desire to 
hold less equity. When all yields have adjusted 
to the point where investors are content to hold 
the  existing  supplies  of  assets,  the  ultimate 
impact  of  equity  yields  depends  on  which 
Treasury security yield had the strongest effect 
on the demand for equity. Thus; equity yields 
will  have changed, although the direction may 
be uncertain. 
To summarize, this discussion suggests that 
a change in  the maturity  composition  of  the 
Federal  debt  affects  the  term  structure  of 
Treasury security interest rates, and that there 
may be further effects on private security yields 
which directly influence nonfinancial economic 
activity. Thus, Federal debt management could 
possibly be used to affect and help stabilize the 
economy. For example, if a debt management 
policy that is consistent with the stimulation of 
the  economy  is  desired,  then  the  relative 
supplies  of  different  maturities  of  Treasury 
securities  should  consist  of  the  combination 
that  maximizes  the  prices  (minimizes  the 
yields) of  private securities. This combination 
of  Treasury securities  most  likely  consists of 
more short-term than long-term  Treasury 
securities  held  by  private  investors  since  the 
demand for equity depends more on the price 
of  long-term Treasury  securities than on  the 
price of short-term Treasury securities. Thus, it 
is  desirable  to  keep  the  price  of  long-term 
Treasury securities high (yields low) in order to 
stimulate the demand for  equity.  However, if 
the  price  of  short-term  Treasury  securities 
becomes  too  low  (yield  too  high),  then 
investors  would  increase  their  demand  for 
short-term Treasury securities and reduce their 
demand for equity.  Therefore,  a  suitable 
balance between the relative supplies of  short- 
and  long-term  Treasury  securities  must  be 
maintained,  but  the  best  combination  most 
likely  has  more  short-term  than  long-term 
Treasury securities. 
At other times, however, it may be desirable 
for  debt  management  policy  to  provide  a 
restrictive  impact  on  the  economy.  For 
example,  during  times  of  inflationary  excess 
aggregate  demand,  the  most  desirable  debt 
management policy may be to reduce the prices 
of  private securities (raise the yields)  to  help 
eliminate the  possibility of  inflation.  Thus,  if 
the  existing  composition  of  the  Federal  debt causes  the  price  of  equity  to be  at its 
maximum, then it may be desirable to increase 
the supply of  long-term  relative  to short-term 
Treasury  securities to reduce  the  price  (raise 
the yield) of equity. 
INTEREST COST MINIMIZATION 
The  reduction  of  interest  costs  on  the 
privately  held  Federal  debt  may  be  an 
additional  objective  for  Federal  debt 
management  policy.  It  may  be  desirable  to 
reduce  interest  costs  when  considering  two 
factors.  First,  the  transfer  of  funds  from 
taxpayers to holders of  the Federal  debt may 
involve disproportionate effects  on individuals 
in different income or wealth classes.  That is, 
there may be a transfer of funds from lower to 
upper income classes. Second, on the portion of 
the  Federal  debt  held  by  foreign  investors, 
there  is  a  net  outflow  of  funds.  That  is,  if 
taxation is used to finance the interest costs on 
the Federal debt, the net result  is  to transfer 
funds from U.S.  taxpayers to foreign investors. 
Interest  costs  may  be  minimized  in  the 
short run  or  the  long run.  A  short-run  cost 
minimization  strategy  could  imply  that  the 
interest  costs  are  minimized  on  a  period-by- 
period basis-ach  month or each quarter, etc. 
Thus, when refunding maturing debt, or when 
making outright substitutions between different 
maturity classes, the policymakers  would 
examine  actual  prevailing  market  yields  to 
calculate the composition  of  the Federal  debt 
that has the lowest total interest cost during the 
period. In most periods, since short-term yields 
are usually below  long-term yields, this would 
imply  a  very  short  average  maturity  for  the 
Federal debt. 
A  short-run interest cost  minimization 
strategy could  call  for  policy  actions  that are 
opposite  to  those  desired  for  purposes  of 
economic stabilization. First, this strategy 
would  rimply  issuing  long-term  Treasury 
securities  when  long-term  yields  are  below 
short-term yields, , and  such  a  yield  structure 
has  sometimes  occurred  during  recessionary 
periods.  Based on the analysis  in  the previous 
section,  issuing  long-term  Treasury  securities 
during a recession may not provide stimulation 
to  the  economy.  Second,  in  times  of  full 
employment, the short-run strategy could  lead 
to excessive liquidity with  possible inflationary 
consequences. 
A long-run cost minimization strategy would 
involve  a  planning horizon  in  which  maturing 
short-term  debt  would  be  rolled  over  several 
times.  Thus,  in  this  case,  there  is  a  choice 
between  issuing long-term  securities  with 
maturity  equal  to the length  of  the  planning 
horizon, or a series of short-term securities with 
uncertain  average  interest  costs  that must  be 
forecasted.  An  optimal  policy  might  be 
formulated by considering the expected interest 
costs and  their  estimated  dispersions  for 
alternative  combinations,  and  then  making  a 
policy choice based on  the subjective  trade-off 
between these two factors. 
A  long-run  interest  cost  minimization 
strategy could  also call for  policy actions that 
are  opposite  to those  desired  for  purposes  of 
economic stabilization.  Under a  long-run 
strategy,  it  is  again  possible  that  a  large 
amount of long-term Treasury securities would 
be  issued  during  a  recession,  and  vice  versa 
during  expansions.  This  is  the  case  since 
long-term  yields  have  sometimes  been  below 
short-term  yields during recessionary  periods, 
and both yields may be expected to rise during 
the  economic  expansion  that  could  shortly 
follow.  Thus,  the  long-run  interest  cost 
minimization  strategy  may  not  provide 
stimulation  to the economy  during  some 
recessions.  In  addition,  there  is  a  greater 
incentive to issue long-term Treasury securities 
at all times with this strategy since "short-term 
22  Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City  Economic Review  February 1978 or floating debt is said to leave the government 
at the mercy of  impatient lenders."" That is, 
by issuing long-term debt the interest costs can 
be stabilized over longer periods. 
CONCLUSION 
This article's  analysis  suggests  that Federal 
debt  management policy should  recognize  the 
trade-off  between  economic  stabilization  and 
interest cost  minimization.  Previous  empirical 
research has supported the "pure expectations" 
hypothesis  of  Treasury  security  yield 
determination thereby implying that changes in 
the maturity composition  of  the  Federal  debt 
11 Richard  A.  Musgrave,  The  Theory of  Public Finance 
(New York: McGraw-Hill Book  Company,  Inc.,  19591,  p. 
599. 
would be ineffective for economic stabilization. 
However,  there  are  several  methodological 
shortcomings in previous research which make 
the  results  questionable.  Many  of  these 
shortcomings  were  avoided  in  the  empirical 
results  reported  in  this  article  by  using  a 
disaggregated  structural model of the Treasury 
securities  market.  Using  the  model,  an 
experiment  suggests  that  debt  management 
may have a significant impact  on  the relative 
yields  of  different  maturities of  Treasury 
securities.  Thus, even  if  debt management  is 
not actively used to stabilize the economy,  the 
resultant maturity composition  of  the  Federal 
debt may have implications for the overall level 
of  economic activity.  Furthermore,  because of 
the impact on the economy from changes in the 
maturity  composition  of  the  Federal  debt, 
interest  cost  minimization  should  not  be  the 
sole objective of debt management policy. 